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ARBITRATORS AND ARBITRABILITY
R. W. FLEMING*
INTRODUCTION
For years arbitrability was a troublesome issue in the courts be-
cause they tended to rule on the merits of a dispute while clothing the
decision in the guise of arbitrability. In 1960 the Supreme Court
rejected this approach and decided that henceforth federal courts
should not deny an order to arbitrate a particular grievance "unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage."' Since then the
lower federal courts have quite faithfully followed the Supreme
Court's directive. Litigants still contend that particular issues are
not arbitrable, but counsel now direct their arguments away from the
merits of the dispute 2
It was always true, of course, that the parties could argue the ques-
tion of arbitrability before the arbitrator and there were many cases
in which arbitrators decided that they did not have jurisdiction of
a particular subject. Did the Trilogy change all this?3 What have
arbitrators been doing with claims of non-arbitrability since the sum-
mer of 1960? That is the question which this article seeks to answer.
As of April, 1962 eighty-three post-Trilogy arbitrability decisions
by arbitrators were found in the reports.4 In twenty-four of the cases
the issue was ruled non-arbitrable. This figure is somewhat deceptive,
however, because fifteen of the twenty-four cases went off on proce-
dural points-usually failure to comply with the time limitations im-
posed by the contract-and did not involve a challenge to the arbitra-
tor's right to consider the substantive issue in a case which was prop-
erly before him.
Forty-five of the eighty-three cases involved a claim that the arbi-
trator had no authority to consider the substantive issue which was
before him. These cases ran the gamut from contracting-out, to
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
2. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 51 L.R.R.M. 2405
(9th Cir. 1962).
3. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
4. The search included the Bureau of National Affairs LA Series, the Com-
merce Clearing House ARB series and the loose-leaf summary of arbitration
awards issued by the American Arbitration Association.
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wages, to discipline and discharge, to seniority, to insurance, to re-
tirement, to scheduling, to plant-closing, to an interesting series of
cases in which the company sought to bring an issue to arbitration
which the union claimed was solely within its province.
Little is to be gained from a statistical analysis of the cases, both
because the statistics are so unsatisfactory to begin with, and because
there is more than one way of classifying certain cases. To flavor the
situation one must dip into the cases. In order to do this some kind
of a classification scheme is necessary. One which permits the entire
spectrum to be put on display includes the following five groupings:
(1) the cases involving procedural defects, (2) the substantively non-
arbitrable cases, (3) claims of arbitrability despite alleged express
provisions to the contrary, (4) arbitrability despite a silent contract
and (5) employer grievances. It will be apparent that there is overlap
among these classifications. The only reason for presenting the sub-
stantively non-arbitrable and employer grievance cases separately,
for instance, is to give them emphasis.
Perhaps it would be well at the outset to mention a semantic diffi-
culty which often seems to frustrate the arbitrator. It is evidenced
by the following quotation from J-M Poultry Packing Co.:
The word "arbitrable" means subject to the decisions of an ar-
bitrator. Therefore the word "non-arbitrable" must be the nega-
tive of "arbitrable," or not subject to the decision of an arbitra-
tor. If this is so, then how can an arbitrator decide that a matter
is not arbitrable after he has subjected the matter to a complete
hearing and a decision? Obviously, if a matter is non-arbitrable,
the arbitrator is prevented from making a decision and arbitrat-
ing. Yet when an arbitrator decides a matter is not arbitrable
after he has heard the case and evaluated the questioned term,
he is doing the very thing he decided he could not do. A most
untenable and unusual position for any logical and reasonable
arbiter to take.5
It is quite true, as the arbitrator suggests, that it makes little sense
to talk about a case being non-arbitrable after that very case has been
been fully heard and a decision rendered. More will be said about
this later.
I. THE PROCEDURAL CASES
By far the largest single category of cases which have been ruled
to be non-arbitrable involved procedural defects of one sort or an-
other. The term must be used loosely, however, and so used it covers
a substantial amount of territory. The easiest and most obvious group
of cases involved situations in which one side or the other failed to
comply with the time limitations for arbitration set forth in the
5. 36 Lab. Arb. 1433 (1961).
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contract.' The other cases grow more complex. In one, the union
demanded that the company negotiate with it on job descriptions
and the arbitrator held that the demand was in the wrong forum.7
In another the company moved some machinery from one plant to
another and the union claimed the right to represent the employees
at the new plant despite the fact that another union had been certified
by the National Labor Relations Board at the new plant. The arbi-
trator refused to hear the grievance on the ground that it had already
been determined by an appropriate federal agency."
Most of the procedural cases which did not involve the question of
time limitations imposed by the contract were ruled to be arbitrable.
A grievant who accepted workmen's compensation and then sought
reinstatement had his grievance heard despite the company's claim
that he was not entitled to process his grievance after accepting com-
pensation for injuries and disability of a permanent nature. A dis-
pute over holiday pay for Good Friday, which happened to be the day
after the expiration of the old contract and before the signing of the
new contract, was ruled arbitrable though the company argued that
there was no contract in effect at the time.10 Two grievances were
held to be arbitrable although it was alleged that employees failed to
to follow the normal procedure of first complying with the order and
then grieving.:1 Two others were allowed although there was some
contention that the grieving employee had accepted a proposed settle-
ment at an earlier stage in the grievance procedure.1 2 A union was
held not to be estopped from processing a grievance on the ground that
it had failed to disclose relevant information within its possession at
an earlier step in the grievance procedure. 3 And the withdrawal of
a first grievance was held not to bar arbitration of the same grievance
when it was presented once again several months later.14 Finally, strik-
ing employees were given standing, over the company's protest, to
process their seniority claims after their jobs had been filled by re-
placements following a strike. 5
6. Cf. Artistic Weaving Co., CCH 61-2 ARB #8595, and Celanese Plastics Co.,
36 Lab. Arb. 1029 (1961).
7. In re Magnavox Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 237 (1960).
S. In re H. H. Robertson Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962).
9. United States Borax & Chem. Corp., CCH 61-2 ARE #8558.
10. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #24-19 (March 15, 1961).
11. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co., CCH 61-1 ARE #8266; In Te Publisher's
tss'n, 37 Lab. Arb. 62 (1961).
12. Baur Bros. Bakery, 36 Lab. Arb. 1422 (1961); Air Reduction Co., CCH
61-3 ARE #8739.
13. Tennessee Prod. & Chem. Corp., CCH 61-1 ARE #8247.
14. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #26-20 (May 15, 1961).
15. In -e Dynamic Mfg., Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. 635 (1960).
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II. NON-ARBITRABLE ON SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
Unlike the procedural cases, which are, with rare exceptions, rela-
tively uninteresting and non-controversial, the cases in which a sub-
stantive issue has been ruled to be non-arbitrable are fascinating. One
of the first evokes strong memories of the much discussed Cutler-
Hammer decision.8 In the latter case the contract contained a clause
stating that the Company would meet with the Union early in July
1946 to discuss payment of a bonus for the first six months in 1946.
The parties did meet and discuss the bonus, but they were unable to
agree. The union then sought to compel the company to arbitrate. The
court turned down the request because, "If the meaning of the provi-
sion of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there
cannot be anything to arbitrate .... ,"17 A dissenting opinion suggested
that reasonable men could differ as to the meaning of the clause in
question.'- Prolonged criticism of the Cutler-Hammer decision was
capped by the statement of the Supreme Court in the American Manu-
facturing case that such a decision "could only have a crippling effect
on grievance arbitration."' 9
The case which brings Cutler-Hammer to mind involves the Hughes
Tool Co. 20 In that case the arbitrator was asked the following ques-
tion: "Is the matter of 'negotiating a general wage revision of base
rates only' a proper issue to be resolved by the grievance procedure
and arbitration under the terms of the Agreement...?" The contract
between the parties provided that "either party may open this [wage]
section ... for the purpose of negotiating a general wage revision of
base rates only by giving written notice .. . ." The union served
notice of its desire to negotiate a general wage increase, the parties
met and made some progress, but were ultimately unable to reach an
agreement. The union then sought to file a general grievance under
which the issue would have been submitted to arbitration. In support
of its contention the union noted that a grievance was defined as "a
dispute, a claim or difference between the Employer and an employee
or the Union, arising out of the terms of this Agreement," that griev-
ances were subject to arbitration, and that the contract contained a
binding no-strike clause. The company, on the other hand, argued
that the negotiation of a general wage increase was not subject to the
grievance procedure, that the contract specifically forbade the arbi-
trators to "add to, subtract from, change or modify" any provision of
16. IAM v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947)
aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
17. Id. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
18. Id. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
19. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960).
20. 36 Lab. Arb. 1125 (1960).
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the agreement, and that the arbitration board could not act on the
union's request without modifying the present agreement.
In a carefully written decision, the arbitrator held that the issue of
a general increase was not subject to arbitration. He noted that the
contract referred to "negotiating" a general revision of base rates,
and did not provide for the referral of unresolved issues arising out
of the negotiations to the grievance procedure. Even if one assumed
that the no-strike clause would prevent a stoppage in connection with
the negotiation of a general increase (a point on which the arbitrator
did not rule), he thought it did not necessarily follow that the union
had the right to demand arbitration.
Since the Supreme Court decisions in the Steelworker cases had
just come down when the Hughes Tool case was presented, counsel for
both sides naturally argued the impact of those decisions before the
arbitrator. After commenting that the Steelworker cases dealt with
the power of federal courts rather than with the discretion of arbitra-
tors, the arbitrator said:
The parties elected to resolve this dispute through arbitration,
and the decision rests upon the judgment of a majority of the
three Arbitrators selected to hear the case. In exercising thatjudgment we should not, in my opinion, be influenced by any cal-
culation of what a court might do if confronted by the same prob-
lem. The dominant theme of the Supreme Court decision referred
to above is that courts typically lack the specialized knowledge,
experience, and insight to deal wisely with these types of prob-
lems. Whether either this assumption, or the corresponding one
that arbitrators typically possess such expertise, is correct is, to
put it mildly, a question on which there is considerable disagree-
ment. In any case, the doctrine enunciated in the Supreme Court
decisions places added responsibility upon arbitrators generally.
The temptation to uphold claims of arbitrability solely on the
ground that a court would do so in like circumstances must be
resisted; for to yield would be to abdicate the assumed inde-
pendence of judgment based on specialized knowledge and expe-
rience upon which the Supreme Court doctrine is predicated.21
It is true that the grievance clause in the Cutler-Hammer contract
committed the parties to the arbitration of any dispute as to the mean-
ing, performance, non-performance or application of the provisions
of the agreement. Nevertheless, there is a substantial similarity be-
tween the cases. Of course, the alleged evil in Cutler-Hammer was
not that the court was wrong on the substantive issue of whether the
parties ever intended to submit the bonus issue to arbitration, but
that it decided that issue at all rather than referring it to an arbitra-
tor. Presumably the parties had agreed to submit any issue to arbitra-
21. Id. at 1129.
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tion and the court had taken this issue away from the arbitrator. "In
these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the
arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it con-
notes that was bargained for. '22
An interesting sidelight on the Hughes case is that there is certainly
language in the Supreme Court's decision in the American Manufac-
turing Co. case which would lead one to believe that when a contract
contained a strong no-strike clause the court thought the grievance
clause ought to be interpreted very liberally. It said, "There is no
exception in the 'no-strike' clause and none therefore should be read
into the grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other."23
Perhaps, as the arbitrator admitted in the Hughes decision, "the court
would have ruled that the issue was arbitrable.124 In a quite similar
case the California District Court of Appeal did in fact rule that the
issue was arbitrable.25 The contract contained a reopening clause
"limited to the negotiating of an increase of five (5) cents per hour."
The union gave proper notice and met with the company, but the
parties were unable to reach an agreement. The union then success-
fully sought an order from the state court compelling arbitration. The
company refused to appear, claiming that the issue was not arbitrable.
In the absence of the company, the arbitrator heard the case and
awarded a five cent increase. The union then sought enforcement of
the award, and the company claimed that the arbitrator had exceeded
his jurisdiction. The court enforced the award, and appeared to adopt
the following language, used by the arbitrator:
The Employer knew the Union's intentions. It knew, or should
have known, that the arbitration clause was so broad as to cover
such a dispute as has arisen. It knew, or should have known, the
law, herein elucidated, that a dispute arising out of an agreement
permitting the contract to be reopened for a limited purpose,
while the no-strike clause remains in effect, is subject to arbitra-
tion if negotiations fail, not only as to the arbitrability of the
claim itself, but also as to the merits of the claim.' ' 26
There is not necessarily any inconsistency between the Hughes Tool
decision and the case decided by the California state court, since there
appears to be a substantial difference in the wage clauses under con-
sideration. In the latter case the rather unusual clause limiting the
parties to "the negotiating of an increase of five (5) cents per hour"
could imply that the parties intended the negotiations to be concerned
22. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
23. Id. at 567.
24. 36 Lab. Arb. 1125, 1129 (1960).
25. Broadway-Hale Stores v. Retail Clerks, 14 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Ct. App. 1961).
26. Id. at 823.
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only with the question of whether there was to be no increase or a
five-cent increase. This kind of issue would be much more susceptible
to arbitration, even in the thinking of the parties, than the open-end
wage negotiation clause.
In another interesting line of cases arbitrators have had to face the
same question which plagued Saul Wallen a few years ago in the
Coca-Cola case. 27 Mr. Wallen had been asked to decide whether the
company's right to discharge was restricted in the absence of a con-
tract clause to that effect. The contract contained the usual recogni-
tion, seniority, grievance and arbitration clauses, but no express limi-
tation on the company's power to discharge. Despite this fact Wallen
ruled that ". . . the meaning of the contract, when viewed as a whole,
is that a limitation on the employer's right to discharge was created
with the birth of the instrument. Both the necessity for maintaining
the integrity of the contract's component parts and the very nature
of collective bargaining agreements are the basis for this conclu-
sion."28
The Wallen decision was the subject of a later comment by Archi-
bald Cox to the following effect:
There is little force to the argument that the implication of a
clause limiting discharges to cases of just cause is necessary to
preserve the integrity of a seniority clause or grievance proce-
dure. The integrity of the seniority and grievance clauses would
not be affected by the arbitrary and capricious discharge of ajunior employee who had no grievance. They can be enforced by
implying an undertaking not to discharge a man for the purpose
of evading seniority or preventing the prosecution of the griev-
ance.
Mr. Wallen's reliance upon "the very nature of collective bargain-
ing agreements" cuts much deeper. He thereby asserts that a
company which signs a collective bargaining agreement auto-
matically assumes some obligations and submits certain manage-
ment actions to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator even though the
agreement says nothing about them. The dissenting member of
the arbitration board spoke the truth when he protested that the
majority "have taken a contract which contained no language
which could possibly be construed as a limitation on the Com-
pany's right of discharge and have implied a very stringent limi-
tation of that right," but this assertion did not meet the basic
contention that employees had rights cognizable by the arbitrator
in addition to those which the contract expressly gave them. 2
27. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., reprinted in Cox, CAsEs ON LABOR LAW 583 (4th ed.
1958).
28. Id. at 586.
29. Cox, Arbitration in Light of the Lincoln Mills Case, in National Academy
of Arbitrators, Arbitration and the Law 24, 48 (McKelvey ed. 1959).
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One of the recent cases involved the American Oil and Supply Co.80
The contract did not include any language on discharge. The arbi-
trator said:
The Union argues that it is an implied clause and that unless such
an implied clause is read into the agreement, the other clauses
such as those dealing with seniority, holidays and vacations are
rendered meaningless. The Union may be correct in this, al-
though the vacation clauses do provide for partial vacation pay
for those employees who leave or who are discharged. However,
this contention would possibly be more relevant if the issue had
to do with the unreasonable denial of holiday pay, vacation rights
or seniority standing. If the employer had juggled seniority lists
or eliminated holiday pay by strategic firings and rehirings, the
arbitrator would be called upon to interpret the expressed provi-
sions of the seniority or holiday clauses. Possibly he might then
impute some restrictions on the right of the employer to defeat
the purpose of these provisions by arbitrarily discharging em-
ployees. This is not the situation in the present case. No claim
is made that the employer has violated these or any other ex-
pressed provisions of the agreement.3 1
Within a year after the above decision another arbitrator had a
chance to rule on the same issue-could an employee carry his dis-
charge to arbitration in the absence of a clause in the contract restrict-
ing the company's right to discharge? In the General Portland Cement
Co.32 case the arbitrator said:
It has been justifiably said "protection against arbitrary dis-
charge is possibly the most important single benefit which the
worker secures from trade unionism." It does more than any-
thing else to make him a free citizen in the plant. Without com-
menting at length on this statement, where the working agree-
ment is silent on the matter of discipline the very nature of the
working agreement, absent a clear proviso to the contrary, makes
clear an implied understanding that the Company does not have
the unilateral right to discipline or discharge an individual with-
out such action being subject to challenge by the Union as to
whether the Company's action was for just cause. It is clear, for
example, that the seniority provision of the working agreement
would, in the final analysis, have little meaning if employees
could be discharged promiscuously by the Company. This is true
for the reason that an individual that otherwise could be dis-
charged without just cause and rehired the following day, as a
result of the Company's action would thereby lose all of his
seniority and related rights and be sent back to the foot of the
seniority roster. The same observation could be made in varying
degrees as regards many other valuable rights earned by em-
30. 36 Lab. Arb. 331 (1960).
31. Id. at 332.
32. CCH 62-1 ARB #8172.
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ployees under the terms of the working agreement. While the
Impartial Arbitrator has generally followed the concept that the
Union has only those rights bargained for and specifically set out
in the contract, for the reasons set forth above he believes that
in this instance there existed an implied agreement to the effect
that management intended to discharge only for cause and that
the Union does have the right to grieve, to process the grievance,
and to have the matter determined on its merits by arbitration. 8
The remaining substantive issues which were held to be non-arbi-
trable represent distinctly different factual situations. In one an em-
ployee fied a grievance asking for recovery on account of damage done
to his eyeglasses when a defective grinding machine shattered. The
arbitrator held that this was not a problem arising out of the terms
of the agreement, that the company had consistently denied all such
claims in the past, and that in the absence of a specific clause the
arbitrator would exceed his jurisdiction to allow recovery. 4 In an-
other the contract gave the company the right to schedule vacations
"in accordance with operational requirements," and the arbitration
clause excluded "any matters of general management questions, man-
agement policy, business requirements [or] operations." A dispute
then arose over the right of the company to require employees to take
their vacations during a period of plant shutdown. It was held that
in the absence of a showing by the union that the company was not
acting in good faith and that the shutdown was not based on produc-
tion needs the dispute was not arbitrable.35 (One wonders whether
this isn't the same old semantic difficulty-didn't the arbitrator simply
rule that the union had failed to meet the burden of showing that
the contract had been violated? Is a dispute arbitrable if the union
meets the burden, but not arbitrable if it does not? Hasn't the arbi-
trator really ruled on the merits in either case?) In a third case the
contract gave the company the "sole right" to determine the "hours
of work," and excluded from arbitration grievances concerning the
"schedule of hours of work." When the company changed the starting
time for cleaning women the union sought to review the decision in
arbitration. It was held that the dispute was not arbitrable, despite
the fact that the company had been unsuccessful in negotiations in
getting a contract provision giving it the express right to change the
starting time36 In the last case the company closed down one of two
divisions in a given city. It offered displaced employees jobs at an-
other division in a different city, but did not offer them employment
33. Ibid.
34. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 1136 (1961).
35. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #30-4 (Sept. 15, 1961).
36. Id., #35-23 (Feb. 15, 1962).
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with the remaining plant in the home city. Each division of the com-
pany had signed the contract separately, and the arbitrator ruled that
he had no authority to make an award allowing employees of one
division to enter the seniority realm of the other.3 7 Like the vacation
case referred to earlier, this appears to be a decision on the merits
rather than a ruling that the issue was not arbitrable.
III. ARBITRABLE DESPITE EXPRESS CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The cases in which the issue has been ruled arbitrable despite ex-
press language in the contract range over a wide variety of subjects,
including retirement, insurance, seniority, work standards and related
wage rates, and discipline and discharge.
The work standards-wage rate cases are particularly interesting.
In Ford Motor Company and UAW 38 the company made a change in
work standards. The contract provided that existing standards could
be changed only in the event of a change in method, equipment, mate-
rial or quality, so that work was added to or taken away from the job.
It also provided that the validity of a new standard could be deter-
mined only by a mutually selected firm of industrial engineers, and
was not within the jurisdiction of the umpire. In the principal case
the union claimed that the company had improperly changed a work
standard, and the company claimed that the matter was not within
the jurisdiction of the umpire. The arbitrator ruled that the question
of whether the company was within its rights in changing the stand-
ard was a different question from the one of whether the standards
were correct in terms of engineering work measurements, and that
the umpire had jurisdiction. In substance, this amounted to saying
that the umpire had authority to determine whether there had been
a change in method, equipment, material or quality. The arbitrator
did not consider the merits of the question, since the parties had
agreed that only the issue of arbitrability was before him.39
Another arbitrator had a somewhat similar case involving the Dura
Corporation." In that case the contract specifically provided that "the
arbitrator shall have no authority over wage rates established under
this Agreement." The company added a semi-automatic welder to its
equipment, and a question arose as to the proper classification of the
operator. The union contended it was more nearly that of an arc
welder, and the company argued that it was parallel to the work of
a spot welder. When they could not agree the company simply posted
37. American Bakeries Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 865 (1961).
38. Ford Motor Co. v. UAW, CCH 61-3 ARB #8913.
39. Ibid.
40. 36 Lab. Arb. 329 (1960).
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the job as that of a spot welder and the union grieved. At the arbi-
tration level the company argued that the case was not arbitrable
because the contract clause deprived the arbitrator of jurisdiction over
wage rates. Following the Ford decision, the arbitrator could have
said that while he had no jurisdiction over wage rates this was not
basically a question of rates but of classification. Once the classifica-
tion question was settled the rate followed automatically. Perhaps
because the rate would follow automatically from a classification deci-
sion the arbitrator ruled that the matter was not arbitrable. 1 In this
sense the matter is distinguishable from Ford. In that case if the
arbitrator ruled that there had been a change in method the question
of the new standard presumably became one for the industrial engi-
neers. In the Dur case any ruling from the arbitrator had the effect
of setting a rate. Perhaps more than anything else the Dura case can
be said to illustrate the enormous difficulty which cases often present
in trying to separate form and substance.
The final work standards-wage rate case involved five grievances
filed in the middle of 1958.42 Subsequently a new contract was nego-
tiated which included the job rates contended for by the company.
The old contract contained a provision stating that grievances con-
cerning job descriptions or job rate changes "during the life of the
contract" would be arbitrable. The company argued that the lan-
guage of the old contract, plus the agreed new contract, barred arbi-
tration of the grievances in question. The arbitrator ruled against
the company, holding that grievances should not be considered extin-
guished by the expiration of the contract under which they arose,
even though the new contract referred to the jobs in dispute, unless
there was a specific agreement settling the pending grievances.
Two retirement cases presented slightly different questions. In one
the arbitrator had jurisdiction over grievances arising "out of any
interpretation or application of any of the terms of the Agreement."42
The seniority provision stated that the company would give light
work to those who could not perform their regular work because of
age, and added that "age 65 is considered the normal retirement age."
The union grieved when the company retired several men who were
over 65. The arbitrator sustained the company on the merits, but
ruled that the dispute was arbitrable since it hinged on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "normal retirement age." In a subsequent
case a company had a unilateral retirement plan in effect and refused
to accept or process a grievance complaining about the forced retire-
ment of an individual because retirement was said to be a manage-
41. Id. at 330.
42. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 65 (1960).
43. National Airlines, 35 Lab. Arb. 67 (1960).
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ment decision not subject to the grievance procedure.44 The arbitrator
ruled that the mere fact that a retirement plan was unilateral did not
mean that the company could administer it in disregard of other con-
tractual rights of employees.
A pair of insurance cases involved substantially the same issue.
One contract provided that disputes "as to whether the Employer has
provided the insurance benefits hereinabove described" should be
subject to the grievance procedure and to arbitration. An employee
grieved because he claimed the sanitarium in which he received treat-
ment did not meet the requirements in the insurance agreement be-
tween the parties.4 5 The umpire ruled that he could interpret the
meaning of language used to describe insurance benefits in the absence
of any language specifically excluding such disputes from arbitration.
In the other situation an insurance carrier refused to indemnify a
worker who sustained a broken arm during a fight.46 The contract
provided that "insurance matters shall not be subject to the grievance
procedure, except that the union shall have the right to grieve in any
instance where the subject matter of such grievance alleges that the
company has failed to purchase the required insurance coverage."
The arbitrator held that the grievance was arbitrable since no part of
the insurance agreement defined accident so as to exclude coverage if
the employee suffered a non-occupational injury. Conceding that such
an exclusion might exist by informal agreement or past practice, the
arbitrator nevertheless thought the union had the right to a hearing
on the merits to see whether it could show that the loss was covered
by the agreement.
The seniority cases which have raised the question of arbitrability
have all involved clauses reserving to the company varying degrees of
unfettered authority to make necessary decisions. In the Jefferson
City Cabinet Co.47 case the contract provided that the company could
retain or hire employees regardless of seniority when by reason of
special training, ability, or experience this was essential for the prac-
tical operation of the plant, and "the Company shall be the sole judge
thereof." A grievance was filed protesting the placement of super-
visors and other non-unit employees in the bargaining unit during a
slack season. The arbitrator ruled that the dispute was arbitrable,
since it involved the interpretation of the contract, but that the com-
pany was right on the merits. A second case, Heckethorn Mfg. &
Supply Co.,48 arose out of the promotion of a junior employee. The
44. Whitlock Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 873 (1961).
45. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1023 (1961).
46. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #22-14 (Jan. 15, 1961).
47. 35 Lab. Arb. 117 (1960).
48. 36 Lab. Arb. 380 (1960).
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contract stated that "promotions and demotions will be based upon
ability, skill, and physical fitness which shall be determined by the
Company. When the above factors are equal in the judgment of the
Company, the employee having the greatest length of service with the
Company will be preferred." The company argued that its discretion
could not be tested in arbitration, and the union contended that it had
been the consistent past practice to promote senior employees. The
arbitrator then ruled that the dispute was arbitrable because the con-
tract did not expressly preclude it, and the union should have an
opportunity to present its argument as to past practices. The com-
pany seems to have been on much weaker ground in the third case.
The contract required that "every consideration" be given to job
bidders. An employee grieved on the ground that "sufficient consider-
ation" had not been given his qualifications for a particular job. The
company insisted that the management rights clause gave it the right
to make a unilateral decision without challenge. The arbitrator not
only ruled that he had jurisdiction to determine whether "every con-
sideration" had been given to the bid, but that he could go further and
award any remedy needed to correct the situation so long as it was
not punitive.49
The discipline and discharge cases, like those involving seniority,
all involve varying degrees of clear unilateral authority in the com-
pany. In Commissary Service Co., Inc.,0 the grievant was discharged
for insubordination when she refused a new assignment after finish-
ing a job. The contract provided that "the right to hire, promote,
discharge, or discipline for cause.., is the sole responsibility of the
Company except that Union members shall not be discriminated
against as such." Other sections of the contract provided that "only
such matters as relate to the interpretation and application of this
agreement are subject to arbitration," that a discharged employee
may "present his grievance to the steward before leaving the prem-
ises," and that "if through the grievance procedure" it is found that
an employee was unjustly discharged he shall be reinstated and re-
imbursed for any time lost. Reading all of the above clauses together
the arbitrator concluded that the company's power to discharge was
limited to instances of just cause. In a very similar case the arbitrator
implied a restriction on the company not expressly stated in the con-
tract.5 1 The whole plant went out on an illegal strike. The contract
provided that participants in or responsible for an illegal strike were
subject to such discipline as "the company may in its exclusive dis-
cretion determine." The company gave several employees three day
49. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #22-14 (Jan. 15, 1961).
50. CCH 62-1 ARB #8247.
51. In e Kaye-Tex Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 660 (1960).
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suspensions, and the employees then grieved. The arbitrator held that
he had jurisdiction to pass upon whether there was discrimination in
the selection of strike participants for discipline, but that he could
not pass on the validity of the degree of penalty involved. This implied
restriction would appear to be broader than the express restriction
imposed by the contract in the Commissary Service Co. case.
Another discipline case clearly illustrates the semantic difficulty
that is often found in arbitrability cases. Brunswick Corp.52 involved
a situation in which several employees were disciplined for participat-
ing in an illegal wildcat strike. The no-strike provision of the contract
provided that the "only issue before the Arbitrator shall be limited to
the employee's participation in such unauthorized activity." Since
none of the grievants denied their participation in the strike, the com-
pany argued that the case was not arbitrable. The arbitrator ruled
against the company, saying that it could not be known whether any
of the grievants would deny participation until evidence was taken
on that question. As the hearing proceeded the grievants admitted
participation in the strike and the abitrator then denied their griev-
ances.
One last decision deserves mention because of some of the language
it contains.53 The contract provided: "Except as otherwise in this
agreement expressly provided, nothing in this agreement shall be
deemed to limit the Company in any way in the exercise of the regular
and customary functions of management including but not limited to
the right to hire, transfer from job to job and department to depart-
ment. . . ." The grievant was transferred from one department to
another without any company explanation. Arbitration was permitted
over any differences "as to the meaning of the terms of this contract
or the existence of violations thereof.. . ." The union contended that
the transfer was unjust because it resulted in a reduction in work and
pay, and that in any event on permanent transfer the company was
required to have a good reason for such action and to tell the employee
why he was being transferred. The company contended that its con-
tractual right to make the transfer was so clear that it need not justify
such moves. Given the union's first contention, that the transfer
resulted in loss of work and pay, it is not particularly surprising that
the dispute was held arbitrable though the arbitrator subsequently
found no merit in this part of the union's claim. The interesting part
of the decision relates to the union's claim that the company had to
have a good reason for its decision and communicate that reason to
the employee. Apparently this was the real sore spot which lay behind
52. 37 Lab. Arb. 951 (1961).
53. In re J-M Poultry Packing Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1433 (1961).
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the grievance. On this score the arbitrator probably raised some
hackles when he intermingled ethics and contractual rights by saying:
In considering this contention ... one is immediately conscious
of the fact that what is in question is a concept as to man's rela-
tionship with man in industrial society and how it should be con-
ducted. Industrial society has come to the realization that man-
the individual-is entitled to an explanation for any action which
involves his job and his sense of security. Such a belief is con-
sistent with the degree of equality and liberty accorded the indi-
vidual in industrial society today. By such action, it is felt the
individual suffers no loss of his natural rights as a human entity
and the rights and freedoms of the Company are not reduced or
restricted.
While such truisms are fast emerging as principles of indus-
trial relations, they have not as yet been established as hard and
fast rules governing the relationship of the parties. Conse-
quently, while failure on the part of the Company to explain to
the grievant the reason for his transfer may be deplored under
today's standards, such an unethical approach is not of sufficient
magnitude to warrant the restriction of clear contractual rights
of the Company. Further, whether the Company's reason for
transferring the grievant is plausible is a matter of opinion and
controversy in which the Arbiter may not engage.... .5
IV. ARBITRABLE DESPITE SILENT CONTRACT
In many ways the silent contract cases are the most interesting of
all because they may say more about the status of the labor-manage-
ment relationship than do any of the others. Given the present empha-
sis on job security, it is not surprising to find that a majority of the
cases involve some kind of company action having manpower reper-
cussions. One which did not, however, presents a rather unique
situation.5 5 A bakery company changed its bookkeeping system for
rotite salesmen. The union filed a grievance, contending that this was
contrary to an oral agreement reached during contract negotiations.
The company insisted that there had been no such agreement, and
that the dispute was not arbitrable. The arbitration clause in the con-
tract permitted "any charge of violation of this Agreement," or "any
charge of discrimination, grievance or dispute" to go to arbitration.
The arbitrator held that he had the power to determine whether the
parties made an oral agreement during negotiations. The grievance
was then denied on the merits because the union failed to prove the
existence of such an agreement.
It will surprise no one to hear that several of the silent-contract
arbitrability disputes involve contracting out. This subject has been
54. Id. at 1437.
55. American Bakeries Co., CCH 61-1 ARB # 8189.
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so well explored in the last few years that there is little left to say
about it.56 Despite the absence of language dealing with subcontract-
ing, every single case was held to be arbitrable. 57 One of them was
the famous Warrior case which went to arbitration following the
Supreme Court's landmark decision.58
The remaining cases deal with a variety of problems. In one the
union sought to challenge the company's right to move machinery
from one plant, which was unprofitable, to another two hundred miles
away.59 The contract permitted "all differences" as to the meaning
and application of the contract, and "any question" relating to its
various provisions to go to arbitration. The action of the company
had the direct consequence of eliminating two job classifications and
combining others. The arbitrator ruled that the phrase "any ques-
tion" was so broad that it was not even necessary to go into whether
a grievance in the formal sense was involved. The issue was arbi-
trable. The discussion of arbitrability contrasts nicely with another
decision rendered in McGough Bakeries Corp.6° In that case one man
was displaced by automation, there having been two men on the job
previously. The contract permitted "any... charge of discrimination,
grievance or dispute" to go to arbitration. The union contended that
the work was too arduous for one man and sought to arbitrate the
issue. The company insisted that the issue was not arbitrable since
no section of the contract had been violated. Because of the broad
grievance clause the arbitrator ruled that the dispute was arbitrable.
But he added:
This does not mean to say that any irresponsible grievance or
dispute which might arise is one of an arbitrable nature. The
question to be decided then is whether or not the term "grievance
or dispute" exists under the terms of the contract. If so then the
matter at hand is arbitrable. If not, there is no arbitrable issue
and the work of the arbitrator ends at that point.61
One wonders whether this isn't further evidence of the semantic diffi-
culty which was mentioned earlier. Does one say that an "irrespon-
sible" grievance is not arbitrable, or that it is arbitrable but without
merit? Would not the latter approach be more logical?
56. See Celanese Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 925 (1959) ; Crawford, The Arbitration of
Disputes Over Subcontracting, in National Academy of Arbitrators, Challenges to
Arbitration 51 (McKelvey ed. 1960).
57. Cf. In re Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 912 (1961).
58. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. v. United Steelworkers, 36 Lab. Arb. 695 (1961).
59. In re Weyerhaeuser Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 308 (1961).
60. In re McGough Bakeries Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 1388 (1961).
61. Id. at 1391.
62. CCH 61-3 ARB #8793.
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Manufacturers and Repairers Ass'n of New Orleanse is an example
of a factual situation in which one party argued that the contract was
silent, and the other argued that the wage appendix controlled the
dispute. The company had inadvertently assigned laborers to do a
job that belonged to the carpenters. When the mistake was discovered
it was immediately rectified. Though the carpenters did not lose any
work or pay they asked for pay for the mis-assigned hours. The union
relied on the wage appendix which set forth rates of pay for various
classifications and the company insisted that since there was no con-
tractual clause relating to assignment of work the issue was not arbi-
trable. A grievance was defined as "any dispute... concerning the
interpretation or application of the terms of this agreement." The
arbitrator ruled that the issue was arbitrable, pointing out that the
wage appendix had no validity unless the right jobs were assigned to
the right people.
The most unusual of the silent contract cases in which arbitrability
was argued was Mechanics Universal Joint Division, Borg-Warner
Corp.63 A steward had accepted a supervisory position after discuss-
ing the opportunity with a member of management. Apparently there
was an understanding that if the new position did not work out the
steward could return to his old job in the production unit. After the
steward became a supervisor he was discharged for inefficiency. He
then grieved, claiming his old job back. The company contended the
grievance was not arbitrable because the man was a supervisor and
was therefore not an "employee" within the terms of the contractual
grievance procedure. The arbitrator ruled that because of the under-
standing reached prior to his promotion the grievant was an employee
with supervisory characteristics or vice versa, and that the dispute
was therefore arbitrable. Since the contract did contain a clause
covering discharge of production employees, and since the effect of
the arbitrator's ruling was to estop the company from denying that
the grievant was an employee, it may be said that this is not a silent
contract case at all. On the other hand, in some ways it represents a
significant addition to the contract for it had the effect of amending
the contract to treat a production employee promoted out of the unit
as though he were still in it.
Finally, there is a Christmas bonus case decided by an arbitrator
which shortly thereafter had its parallel in a federal court decision.
In the arbitration case the company unilaterally terminated a Christ-
mas bonus which had been awarded to all employees for a number of
years.6 4 The union grieved, and the company claimed that the dispute
63. CCH 61-1 ARB #8257.
64. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #33-3 (Dec. 15, 1961).
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was not arbitrable because the contract contained neither a reference
to the Christmas bonus nor a past practice clause, and the arbitrator
was limited to disputes "arising out of the terms of the contract or
the interpretation thereof." The grievance was held arbitrable, on
the theory that while the arbitrator was limited to what the parties
had agreed to this necessarily required identifying the constructive as
well as the actual agreements. To limit the arbitrator to disputes ex-
pressly covered in the contract would, he thought, fail to recognize
the decisive and outstanding differences that distinguish labor-man-
agement agreements from commercial contracts, wills, deeds of trust
and similar consensual agreements. Subsequently a federal court took
the same position on very similar facts. In the Harris Structural Steel
Co.65 case the contract did not contain a clause covering the Christmas
bonus which the company had been awarding for some fifteen years,
but the annual payment had been made and it was related in amount
to hours, rate of pay, and length of service. When the company re-
duced the Christmas bonus by fifty per cent the union brought a
grievance. The company sought to stay arbitration by seeking a
declaratory judgment that the dispute was not arbitrable. The con-
tract contained a no-strike clause. The court held that the Christmas
bonus was related to wages, that the bonus was not excluded from
the grievance procedure, that the parties had agreed to arbitrate
differences as to the meaning and interpretation of the contract, and
that the dispute was therefore arbitrable.
V. EMPLOYER GRIEVANCES
Since the initiative remains with management in connection with
the administration of the collective bargaining agreement most griev-
ances are naturally in response to an act of management. It follows
that in the course of processing the grievance it will usually be man-
agement which will insist that the grievance is not arbitrable. How-
ever, this is not always so, and there are several cases in which it is
the union which insists that the dispute cannot go to arbitration.
In re Meletron Corp.6 involved a strike situation in which five union
members crossed the picket line. The contract contained a no-strike
clause and an arbitration clause. A return-to-work agreement was
worked out under which it was agreed that the returning employees
would not discriminate against the men who stayed on the job or were
hired after the strike commenced. Soon thereafter the union tried
and fined the five members who crossed the picket line. The company
65. Harris Structural Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 298 F.2d 363 (3d Cir.
1962).
66. 36 Lab. Arb. 315 (1961).
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contended that this action violated the strike settlement agreement.
The union insisted that this issue was not arbitrable because it was
an internal union affair, and because the company could not process
a grievance without the aggrieved employee. Despite his stated belief
that "there may be a good deal of potential mischief in the Warrior
notion of specific exclusion," and his conclusion that this is "far too
mechanistic an approach to the difficult and delicate problems of inter-
pretation of a particular collective agreement," the arbitrator con-
cluded that the dispute was arbitrable. He reasoned that since the con-
tract contained a no-lockout clause "to hold that the employer does
not possess either the right to grieve or the right to lockout would
manifestly be unfair. In that context, it is not mechanistic to conclude
that if the Parties had wished to impose that strong a disadvantage
upon the employer (and upon the prospect of success in their overall
relationship) they should have done so quite explicitly." 7
The Meletron decision is interesting not only because it represents
a rather infrequent situation, but also because of the arbitrator's
statement of the management prerogative theory. He said:
[I]t has traditionally been argued by employers that all those
powers possessed by them prior to the execution of a collective
agreement continue to exist except as qualified by the terms of
the new agreement. Since arbitrators necessarily are a rather
pragmatic group there has been observable in arbitral decisions
a considerable reluctance to embrace that concept as an all inclu-
sive and valid generalization. Although it has a surface appeal
because of its simplicity, like the Warrior principle of specific
exclusion it appears unduly mechanical as the reason for an
arbitral decision when one takes into account the basic nature andjustification of labor-management arbitration. But in the cir-
cumstances of this case, to the degree to which that concept may
be applicable, it would indicate a decision that the employer has
a right to grieve and go to arbitration about conduct by the Union
allegedly violative of the collective agreement. 68
In re Publishers' Ass'n8 9 was another case in which the contract was
silent on the issue which management wished to bring to arbitration.
The controversy arose out of a situation in which the publisher wished
to run pre-print runs and the union advised him that there would be a
work stoppage unless two additional men were assigned to each of
three presses. The publisher hired the men and paid them under pro-
test. It then sought to arbitrate its claim for reimbursement, conse-
quential damages, and further relief to prevent this happening in the
future. The union argued that since the agreement was silent on the
67. Id. at 319.
68. Id. at 318-19.
69. 36 Lab. Arb. 195 (1960).
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question of manning a press under such circumstances the dispute
could not be arbitrated. The arbitrator ruled against the union. Once
again the language is interesting:
The history of labor unions in the United States, to a considerable
extent, is the story of how employees fought to achieve grievance
and arbitration procedures which would enable them to enforce
agreements without the necessity of resorting to litigation in the
courts or to economic force which caused great damage to the
parties in conflict and to the public generally....
Insinuations or suggestions of stoppage, slowdown, strike or
the application of other types of economic action as an alternative
to the use of the grievance and arbitration machinery, by a Union,
constitute rejection and a denial of the historical aspirations of
labor unionism, as well as the collective bargaining agreement in
which such provisions are set forth. If such direct action should
be regarded as excusable or understandable where the Union pro-
tests that the Management action objected to constitutes a hazard
to life or limb or health, or where the relief that might be afforded
later by an arbitrator would be inadequate to make the injured
party whole, such direct action surely cannot be countenanced
where the damages are of a monetary nature only.70
The third situation in which the union contended the company
could not bring the matter to arbitration involved a case in which
third shift employees were refusing to work on shifts extending into
holidays because of disagreement over the pay for such shifts. 71 The
company sought an interpretation of the holiday pay clause and the
union argued that the issue was not arbitrable because the company
was trying to alter a past practice. The grievance was not only held
arbitrable, but the umpire went further and ruled for the company
on the merits on the ground that there was a meeting of the minds
during negotiations even though the written contract did not contain
such an agreement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
What, if any, generalizations can one draw from the arbitrability
cases before arbitrators? If the reported cases are a fair example, at
least five conclusions seem warranted. They are:
1. The air would be cleared if the term "arbitrability" could be dis-
carded from the arbitrator's lexicon. It gives rise to both semantic
and substantive difficulties. There is a patent contradiction in terms
for an arbitrator to announce, after a full hearing has been accorded
the matter, that a given issue is not arbitrable. How can it be non-
arbitrable when a full scale arbitration hearing has just been held?
A decision which simply said that the grievance was dismissed because
70. Id. at 199-200.
71. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, #28-7 (July 15, 1961).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the contract did not give the arbitrator authority to rule on the issue
would be much more understandable.
On the substantive side, surely the cases reveal that arbitrators are
as guilty as the courts ever were of basing a decision on the merits
and then clothing the result in terms of arbitrability. This only adds
confusion to the picture. Why should an arbitrator be reluctant to
say that an issue has no merit? His analysis almost invariably reveals
that this is his conclusion. The decision would be sounder if he said so.
2. Only in the cases where there is a clear procedural defect is
there a strong likelihood that the arbitrator will rule a dispute non-
arbitrable.
3. Where a substantive issue is involved the chances are very good
that the arbitrator will rule the dispute arbitrable. This may, how-
ever, not be very significant. Parties wishing to avoid arbitration are
likely to draw a tight contract and then insist on a court test of arbi-
trability.72 This suggests that arbitrators get the cases in which non-
arbitrability is less of an issue.
4. "Institutional" factors which do not appear in the contract, will
influence the outcome of the decision as to arbitrability. Several ex-
amples from the cases illustrate this point. In Hughes Tool the arbi-
trator was not influenced by whether a court might have ruled the
dispute arbitrable because this would be "to abdicate the assumed
independence of judgment based on specialized knowledge and experi-
ence"7 which arbitrators are supposed to have. It is common knowl-
edge among students of industrial relations that the parties to a
contract do not normally expect to arbitrate wages under a re-opener
clause. This knowledge of the institution of collective bargaining was
doubtless influential in bringing about the decision which the arbitra-
tor reached. By the same token, another abitrator thought that the
absence of a discharge clause could not mean that the parties did not
intend to arbitrate discharge cases because "the very nature of the
working agreement, absent a clear proviso to the contrary, makes
clear an implied understanding that the Company does not have the
unilateral right to discipline or discharge an individual .... -"14 In still
another case the issue of whether a Christmas bonus must be awarded
was arbitrable because the arbitrator thought that to limit the arbi-
trator to disputes expressly covered in the contract would fail to rec-
ognize the difference between labor-management contracts and com-
mercial contracts, wills, deeds of trust and similar consensual agree-
72. United Steelworkers v. General Elec. Co., 211 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio
1962).
73. In re Hughes Tool Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1125, 1129 (1960).
74. In re General Portland Cement Co., CCH 62-1 ARB #8177.
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ments.75 Finally, the employer grievance cases illustrate situations in
which, given their knowledge of labor-management relations, arbitra-
tors concluded that it would be unfair "to hold that the employer does
not possess either the right to grieve or the right to lockout, '76 or to
conclude that the union did not recognize the right of the employer to
grieve since this would constitute "rejection and a denial of historical
aspirations of labor unionism. ' '77
5. There is little evidence in the arbitrability cases that arbitrators
subscribe to an unfettered management prerogative theory which
would place in the hands of management (and "management" can,
under certain circumstances, be either the company or the union) all
powers previously had or exercised unless such powers have been
curtailed or eliminated by statute or contract. It may well be that
arbitrators have no articulate theory of the management prerogative.
Nevertheless, the drift of the decisions is in the direction of permitting
review over any significant unilateral act which affects the relation-
ship of the parties.
In the absence of a prior court decision sending the case to arbitra-
tion it seems fair to say that prospects for any excitement as to the
issue of arbitrability before arbitrators are not very great. But what
about cases in which courts rule that the issue is appropriate for arbi-
tration and the case then comes to an arbitrator? Will arbitrators
ever say, upon receipt of such a case, that it is non-arbitrable? Or
has that issue already been decided? Drake Bakeries"8 furnishes an
interesting example of the problem. The court sustained the union's
contention that the company's claim for damages had to be submitted
to arbitration. Some arbitrators feel that the parties do not intend
to give arbitrators authority to award damages in such cases.79 Should
such an arbitrator refuse to take the case? If he does take the case
could he rule that the parties did not intend to give the arbitrator
power to award damages? What if he did? Could the company then
reinstate its court claim?
The fun may not be over-new and more difficult questions arising
out of arbitrability may be over the horizon s°
75. American Arb. Ass'n's Summary of Awards, # 33-3 (Dec. 15, 1961).
76. In re Meletron Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 315, 319 (1961).
77. In re Publishers' Ass'n, 36 Lab. Arb. 195, 199 (1960).
78. Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Cf. In re Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061 (1958).
80. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 310 F.2d 244 (9th
Cir. 1962).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1963/iss2/5
Washington University Open Scholarship
